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Class Actions and the Poor
HENRY ROSE*
I. THE PROBLEM
Imagine that you are a legal aid lawyer in America whose services are
funded by the Federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC).1 You interview
a prospective client and learn that she was recently laid off from her job;
she applied for and was denied Unemployment Insurance (UI)2 benefits by
the state; and she is in a desperate financial situation. 3 You accept the cli-
ent's case to determine whether she has a legal basis to challenge the de-
nial of her UI claim. You research your client's problem and form the
opinion that the denial of her UI claim was based on a provision of state
law that conflicts with a superior federal law. You also realize that thou-
sands of other needy state residents are likely denied UI benefits each year
for the same reason as your client and that the amount of UI financial assis-
tance that they lose as a result may be in the millions of dollars. You dis-
cuss your research with your client and she desires to pursue litigation that
will not only seek a judicial remedy for herself but also for the other state
residents who face the same problem. The obvious judicial avenue for
your client to pursue is a class action4 case against the state, but you cannot
file such a case because a 1996 federal law prohibits you from participating
in class actions.
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author wishes to
thank the following persons: Fred Barnhart, Maura Deady, and Lee Robertson for research assistance;
Nelson Brown, Jeffrey Gilbert, Robert Lehrer, and Joseph Mueller for providing information and
insights about the Pennington case; Brett Frischmann, Jerry Norton, Spencer Waller, and Anita
Weinberg for commenting on drafts; and Elaine Gist and Christine Heaton for production assistance.
1. The Federal Legal Services Corporation was created and funded by Congress in 1974 to provide
free legal services to low-income Americans in civil cases. See Legal Services Corporation Act of
1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961(2006).
2. Unemployment Insurance is a joint federal-state program that provides temporary financial aid
to persons who involuntarily lose ajob and are seeking a new one. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (2006).
3. The scenario described here is based on the class action filed by Luella Pennington against
Illinois officials in 1984 when LSC-funded attorneys could pursue class action cases on behalf of their
clients. See Pennington v. Doherty, 110 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, vacated on other
grounds, 522 U.S. 909 (1997).
4. A class action in civil litigation is when a person(s) is allowed to represent the interests of a
large group of unnamed persons who share a common legal position.
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II. PURPOSE
The purpose of this article is to examine the policy justifications for
the 1996 federal law5 that prohibits lawyers and legal assistance organiza-
tions funded by LSC from initiating or participating in class action litiga-
tion. No other attorneys in America who engage in civil litigation are
barred by law from representing their clients in class action cases. This
article will consider whether this prohibition is justified for LSC-funded
attorneys. It will also explore the consequences of the prohibition for low-
income persons and for American society.6 This examination of the policy
justifications for the class action prohibition will be done in the context of
a review of Pennington v. Doherty,7 a typical class action case filed on
behalf of low-income persons.
III. HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR AND THE ROLE OF
CLASS ACTIONS
Prior to the mid-1960s, a poor person in America with civil legal prob-
lems could receive free representation largely through urban, bar associa-
tion-sponsored legal aid programs8 or through pro bono representation by
private attorneys. Even though low-income Americans faced many legal
problems then, two-thirds of them never sought the assistance of an attor-
ney.9
In 1965, the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity created the Legal
Services Program (LSP) to provide lawyers for the poor in civil cases on a
national basis.' 0 The new LSP was part of the federal government's War
on Poverty and it was designed to reform the law on behalf of the poor as
5. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §
504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) [hereinafter OCRAA]. The prohibition was implemented by the Legal
Services Corporation via an amendment to its regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (2007).
6. This article will not address the constitutionality of the prohibition of LSC-funded attorneys
from participating in class action litigation because that question has been explored elsewhere. See
Ilisabeth Smith Bomstein, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of the
Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 693
(2003); Jessica A. Roth, It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A Constitutional Challenge to the 1996 Re-
strictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 107 (1998). Also, the prohi-
bition has withstood constitutional challenge in Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 566,
595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
7. 110 F. 3d 502 (7th Cit. 1997), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 909 (1997).
8. Alan W. Houseman, Legal Aid History, in POVERTY LAW MANUAL FOR THE NEW LAWYER 18
(2002).
9. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 61 (2004).
10. Houseman, supra note 8, at 18-20.
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well as to represent indigent persons with individual legal problems."
Coincidentally, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was sub-
stantially amended in 1966, introducing the modem class action proce-
dure.' 2 This new class action procedure was used by LSP lawyers in fed-
eral litigation to pursue law reform for their low-income clients.'
3
LSP lawyers brought a substantial number of cases that were decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 14 Among
these cases were class action cases in which important legal precedents
were established favoring LSP clients. For example, in King v. Smith," the
Supreme Court held that federal standards for government benefits pro-
grams were superior to conflicting state standards. In the companion
cases, Goldberg v. Kelly16 and Wheeler v. Montgomery, 7 the Court
launched the due process revolution 18 by requiring that welfare recipients
be afforded procedural due process protections when government officials
planned to terminate their welfare benefits.
The success that LSP lawyers and their clients achieved in the U.S.
Supreme Court and other fora made for some powerful enemies; governors
from Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, and Missouri sought to
veto LSP activities in their states. 19 Vice President of the United States,
Spiro Agnew, criticized the activities of LSP lawyers as the "Federal Gov-
ernment funding a program designed to effectuate major political
changes. ,,20
In the early 1970s, bar officials, members of Congress, and officials of
the Administration of President Richard Nixon began to discuss the crea-
tion of an independent legal services entity that would be insulated from
political pressures. E' In 1974, these discussions led Congress to create the
Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a not-for-profit corporation whose
11. William P. Quigley, Legal Services: The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid:
Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960s to the 1990s, 17 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L.
REV. 241, 245 (1998).
12. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 791 (6th ed. 2004).
13. CHARLES K. ROWLEY, THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEGAL SERVICES
IN THE UNITED STATES 364 (1992).
14. LSP lawyers took 219 cases to the U.S. Supreme Court from 1967 to 1972; 136 were decided on
the merits, including seventy-three that were decided in favor of LSP clients. EARL JOHNSON JR.,
JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 189
(1974).
15. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
17. 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
18. Houseman, supra note 8, at 23.
19. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 193.
20. Spiro Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Programs, 58 A.B.A. J. 930, 931 (1972).
21. Houseman, supra note 8, at 20.
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board was to be independent and non-partisan.2 2 LSC was funded by an-
nual appropriations from Congress.23 Although certain types of cases
could not be pursued by LSC-funded lawyers (e.g., school desegregation
cases), 24 these lawyers could participate in class action litigation if they
had the express approval of the project director of their local program in
accordance with policies established by the governing body of the pro-
gram.
25
The initial years of LSC in the late 1970s saw a dramatic increase in
congressional funding and expansion of services from initially urban areas
to virtually all counties in the United States.26 However, the election of
Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 resulted in a dramatic challenge to the
continued existence of LSC. While President Reagan was governor of
California in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he frequently clashed with
LSP-funded programs in California that had mounted successful legal chal-
lenges to certain administrative initiatives involving farmworkers and wel-
fare recipients.2 7 Governor Reagan unsuccessfully sought to veto federal
funding for LSP-funded activities in California.28
In his first proposed federal budget in 1981, President Reagan recom-
mended the defunding of LSC.29 Due to intense lobbying by the American
Bar Association and others, LSC survived elimination, but its funding from
Congress in 1982 was reduced by twenty-five percent.30 These budget cuts
resulted in the closing of hundreds of legal services field offices and the
elimination of thousands of attorney and paralegal positions in LSC-funded
programs. 31 Also in 1982, Congress sought to limit law reform activities
by LSC grantees by imposing new limitations on class actions against gov-
ernment entities, requiring local program directors to determine before a
class action is filed that the government entity is not likely to change a
policy or practice that is adverse to low-income clients; the government
entity has been given notice of the planned class action; and responsible
22. Pub. L. No. 93-355, §§ 1003(a), 1004(a), 88 Stat. 378 (1974).
23. See id. § 1010(a).
24. Id. § 1007(b)(7).
25. Id. § 1006(d)(5).
26. Houseman, supra note 8, at 21.
27. Quigley, supra note 11, at 248, 250, 254-55.
28. Id. at 248-50.
29. Id. at 256.
30. Id. at 257. Although the Reagan Administration and its supporters were not able to eliminate
LSC altogether, they hobbled LSC programs in the 1980s by appointing members to the LSC Board of
Directors who were hostile to its goals and imposed new restrictions and administrative burdens on the
local programs that LSC funded. Id. at 257-58.
31. Houseman, supra note 8, at 22.
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efforts to resolve the dispute have been unsuccessful or would harm the
low-income clients.
32
Congressional funding for LSC declined in real terms in the 1980s,33
but advocates for the legal rights of the poor were buoyed by the election
of President William Clinton in 1992 because he strongly supported LSC.34
Nevertheless, congressional elections in 1994 resulted in Republicans tak-
ing control of both chambers of Congress and ushered in a new period of
crisis for LSC.
Initially, the new congressional leadership proposed to phase out
LSC, 35 but they were not able to muster enough support for this drastic
measure. However, in 1996, Congress reduced funding for LSC by more
than thirty percent, resulting in the closing of 200 field offices and the loss
of 900 attorney positions. 36 Congress also imposed new legislative restric-
tions on activities by LSC grantees.37 Among the new restrictions was a
prohibition on LSC recipients from initiating or participating in any class
action.38 This 1996 legislation, the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996 (OCRAA), ended the involvement of LSC-
funded attorneys and their clients in class actions.39
A. Pennington v. Doherty
A case that was typical of the class actions that LSC-funded attorneys
filed on behalf of their low-income clients before OCRAA was Pennington
v. Doherty.40 Pennington will serve as a case study examining Congress's
ban on class actions by LSC-funded lawyers.
Luella Pennington was employed by a messenger service in Chicago,
Illinois before she was laid off in 1984. In June, 1984, she applied to the
32. Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, 1875 (1982).
33. Houseman, supra note 8, at 22, Legal Services Corporation Appropriations table.
34. Id. at 23.
35. See Legal Aid Act of 1995, H.R. 2277, 104th Cong. (1995).
36. Houseman, supra note 8, at 22-23, Legal Services Corporation Appropriations table.
37. See OCRAA, supra note 5. These restrictions on LSC-funded entities prohibited the following:
efforts to influence the passage of legislation or the issuance of regulations on any agency action at any
level of government; encouraging individuals to participate in any political activity; seeking to reform
any federal or state welfare system through litigation, lobbying or rule-making; any requests for attor-
neys fees in litigation even if authorized by other federal or state law; participation in any litigation
involving abortion; assisting any persons incarcerated in federal, state or local prisons; assisting any
illegal aliens; assisting any person charged with the illegal sale or use of drugs in a case seeking to evict
them from public housing; supporting any litigation involving reapportionment; and participation in
any class action. See OCRAA, supra note 5, § 504(a).
38. Id. § 504(a)(7).
39. OCRAA, supra note 5.
40. 116 F. 3d 502 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 909 (1997).
2007
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State of Illinois for Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits that were de-
signed to provide her with financial assistance while she sought a new job.
Ms. Pennington's June 1984 application for UI benefits was denied be-
cause she had not earned enough qualifying wages during her base period.
In Illinois, a UI claimant's base period is the first four of the five calendar
quarters immediately prior to the quarter in which the claimant applies for
benefits, 4 and the claimant must have earned at least $1600 in wages dur-
ing the base period.42 Thus, since Ms. Pennington had applied for UI in the
second quarter of 1984, her base period under Illinois law was the four
calendar quarters of 1983. Since she had not earned the requisite wages in
1983, Ms. Pennington's UI claim was denied.
Ms. Pennington contacted the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago
(LAFC), a LSC-funded legal services agency serving low-income resi-
dents, seeking assistance on the denial of her UI claim. The attorneys at
LAFC researched Ms. Pennington's problem and concluded that if Illinois
considered her base period to include the quarter immediately preceding
the quarter in which she applied for UI (i.e., the lag quarter), then Ms. Pen-
nington and thousands of other similarly situated UI applicants in Illinois
would be eligible to receive UI benefits sooner after their loss of employ-
ment. Further, the LAFC attorneys determined that applicable provisions
of federal law required that states provide U benefits promptly. 43 There-
fore, they opined that Illinois's refusal to consider the lag quarter as part of
the base period violated superior federal law.
In 1985, LAFC attorneys filed a class action lawsuit in federal district
court on behalf of Ms. Pennington and all others who had been or would be
denied UI benefits because Illinois's statutory definition of the base period
excluded the lag quarter." The case had a complex and lengthy history,
but in 1996 the district court found that the failure of Illinois to consider
the lag quarter, as part of the base period, adversely affected the eligibility
of between 14,000 and 40,000 Illinois applicants for Ul each year, result-
ing in the annual loss of between $30,000,000 and $40,000,000 in UI bene-
fits to them.45 The district court further found that changes in technology
41. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/237, 242 (2007).
42. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/500(E) (2007).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 640.3(a) (2007).
44. The Pennington class was certified to be:
All claimants for unemployment insurance benefits under the Illinois Unemployment Insur-
ance Act ("the Act") who since July 15, 1983, have been, are being or will be denied such
benefits by the Illinois Department of Employment Security solely because part or all of
their wages otherwise sufficient to satisfy section 500 (E) of the Act were disregarded by
operation of Section 237 of the Act.
Pennington v. Doherty, No. 85 C 6327, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1058, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1986).
45. Id. at *30.
Vol. 6, No. I
HeinOnline  -- 6 Pierce L. Rev. 60 2007-2008
CLASS ACTIONS AND THE POOR
had made it feasible to consider wages from the lag quarter in determining
UI eligibility and that failure to consider lag quarter wages violated the
Federal Social Security Act's requirement that UI benefits be paid
promptly "when due.' '46 Finally, the district court authorized a permanent
injunction prohibiting Illinois from applying its statutory definition of base
period to the class represented by Ms. Pennington.47 In 1997, the Seventh
Circuit affrmned.48
The Pennington decisions represented a victory for the thousands of Il-
linois residents who lose their jobs each year and who need UI financial
assistance while they seek new employment.49 Yet, no LSC-funded attor-
ney could participate in a class action like Pennington after OCRAA was
enacted in 1996.
B. Policy Reasons for Prohibition on Class Actions
Why did Congress prohibit LSC-funded attorneys for the poor from
participating in any class action litigation? The legislative history of the
prohibition is scant, but what exists indicates that there were two primary
policy reasons for the prohibition: (1) LSC grantees should represent indi-
viduals only and should not seek to pursue the interests of the poor as a
group, 50 and (2) Advocacy for political and social change for the poor is
not an appropriate use of federal funds.5t
While these two policy reasons can be discerned from the legislative
history of the class action prohibition, it is also apparent that broader po-
litical forces were at work in imposing the OCRAA restrictions on LSC.
46. Id. at *34-35.
47. Id. at *36.
48. Pennington v. Doherty, 110 F. 3d 502 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds,
522 U.S. 909 (1997).
49. Approximately four months after the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in 1997 affirming that
federal law required Illinois to consider lag quarter wages as part of the Illinois base period, the Federal
Social Security Act was amended by Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251. The effect of this amendment
was to no longer subject state UI programs to the "when due" provision of federal law. As a result of
this amendment, Illinois did not have to consider a former worker's lag quarter wages to be part of the
UI base period. However, Illinois enacted P.A. 93-634 in 2003 to amend the Illinois Unemployment
Insurance Act to require that lag quarters be considered part of the state's base period beginning in
2008.
50. See 141 CONG. REc. S14608 (1995) (Senator Pete V. Domenici commenting, "I want everyone
to know the reason for the prohibitions is because legal services, when it was founded by Richard
Nixon in association with the American Bar, intended this to represent individual poor people in indi-
vidual cases, not to represent a class of poor people suing a welfare agency or suing a legislature or
suing the farmers as a class"); Legal Services Corporation, Supplemental Information Regarding the
Final Rule on Class Action Participation, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,754 (1996).
51. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 566, 595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that in
discussing class actions and other restrictions, the committee "understood that advocacy on behalf of
poor individuals for social and political change is an important function in a democratic society" but
did "not believe that such advocacy is an appropriate use of federal funds").
2007
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Republican congressional leadership in 1995-1996 desired to phase out
LSC, and they proposed legislation to accomplish this goal. A substantial
number of other members of Congress supported the continuation of LSC
but concluded that its long-term political survival depended on fundamen-
tal modifications in its service delivery system, including the elimination
of class actions. 3 Alexander D. Forger, President of LSC in 1995 and
1996, was informed by congressional supporters of LSC that unless class
actions were eliminated, LSC could not survive. 54 Thus, a legislative com-
promise was reached in 1996-class actions and some other controversial
activities of LSC grantees were restricted and LSC survived, albeit with a
thirty percent decrease in funding.55
IV. ANALYSIS OF POLICY REASONS TO PROHIBIT CLASS ACTIONS BY
LSC-FUNDED ATTORNEYS
A. Focus on Individual Client Problems
The first identifiable policy reason supporting the ban on LSC-funded
attorneys pursuing class action cases is to focus these attorneys on assisting
individual poor persons with legal problems rather than focusing on the
poor as a group. This rationale assumes that individual low-income per-
sons with civil legal problems will be disadvantaged if their lawyers pursue
class action cases. However, this policy reason misses the point of the
class action procedural mechanism. A class action is simply a means to
aggregate the claims of a large number of individuals who happen to share
a common legal position. A successful class action offers meaningful judi-
cial relief to those individuals who comprise the class.
The Pennington class included all persons in Illinois who would apply
for UI benefits but whose claims would be denied because Illinois statutes
excluded their lag quarter wages from their base periods.5 6 Annually, be-
52. See Legal Aid Act of 1995, H.R. 2277, 104th Cong.
53. 141 CONG. REC. S14573, 14608 (1995) (Senator Arlen Specter, commenting, "I, frankly, have
some concerns about the limitations which are present in this bill. I talked to Senator Domenici about
them, especially the limitations on the use of non-Federal funds, and I know that this is a compromise
to try to get the extra funding, to have some limitations. I have grave reservations about these limita-
tions. But I do know this--even with the money which is left, this is not enough to handle individual
cases where individuals need representation on complex legal matters."); Houseman, supra note 8, at
23.
54. Alexander D. Forger, Symposium Address: The Future of Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 333, 335 (1998).
55. Id.; Houseman, supra note 8, at 23.
56. Pennington v. Doherty, No. 85 C 6327, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1058, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 11,
1986).
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tween 14,000 and 40,000 people have their UI applications summarily de-
nied by Illinois for this reason. 57 Each of these thousands of claimants is
an individual who would face a serious legal problem, i.e., ineligibility for
UI at a time of financial need due to loss of employment income. Pursuing
judicial relief in a class action that challenged the exclusion of lag quarter
wages from their base periods afforded these thousands of individuals an
opportunity to seek judicial relief in one case. Thus, the class action in
Pennington sought to benefit thousands of individuals who happen to share
a common legal position. Class actions like Pennington do not serve to
disadvantage the legal interests of the individuals who comprise the class.
Rather, they simply aggregate the shared claims of these individuals in one
suit.
Could class action involvement by LSC-funded attorneys limit their
ability to serve other low-income clients with individual problems? In a
facile sense, the answer is yes because an attorney's involvement in a
complex class action like Pennington would undoubtedly reduce the attor-
ney's ability to handle a large number of other individual cases (e.g., di-
vorces). However, in a more important sense, a class action affords the
attorney an opportunity to provide meaningful judicial relief to a large
number of unnamed individuals who face the same legal problem as the
named party. While the plaintiffs' attorneys in Pennington could handle
fewer individual cases because of their involvement in a class action case,
they sought in Pennington to avert a serious legal problem for thousands of
other individuals, i.e., ineligibility for UI in Illinois at a time of great fi-
nancial need.
Even when LSC-funded attorneys could lawfully participate in class
actions, the number of class actions they participated in was very small. In
1995 (the last year that class action representation was allowed), LSC-
funded lawyers handled 134,161 court cases for their clients; 630, or
0.47% of the total court cases were class action cases. 58 The percentage of
LSC court cases that were class actions had steadily declined from the late
1980s to 1995.' 9 Thus, even though class actions were a sliver of all court
cases that LSC-funded attorneys were involved in, Congress still saw fit to
ban them in 1996.
LSC regulations that implement the OCRAA restriction on class ac-
tions do not prohibit LSC-funded attorneys from referring their clients to
private attorneys for class action representation. 60 However, such referrals
57. Id. at *28.
58. Michael Givel, Legal Aid to the Poor: What the National Delivery System Has and Has Not
Been Doing, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 369, 379, tbl. 4 (1998).
59. Id. at 379-80.
60. See 45 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (2006).
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deprive low-income persons of legal representation by the attorneys with
the deepest knowledge of the laws that affect them. Many of the govern-
ment benefit programs that exist to assist low-income people, like UI, are
complex federal-state statutory and regulatory schemes that require exten-
sive experience to master. The decision in Pennington favoring UI claim-
ants in Illinois was based on an intricate argument that federal statutes and
regulations required a more expansive interpretation of the base period
than Illinois statutes allowed.6' It is unlikely that many private attorneys,
who have little or no experience representing UI claimants, would have
developed these arguments on their own.
When OCRAA was enacted in 1996, LSC interpreted it to require that
LSC-funded lawyers withdraw as attorneys for their clients in all pending
class action cases.62 Efforts were undertaken, with the assistance of the
American Bar Association, to identify private attorneys who would be
willing to substitute for LSC-funded attorneys in the pending cases, but
substitute counsel was not found in all cases and some were dismissed for
this reason.63 The reality is that private attorneys will not be willing to
pursue all worthy class actions on behalf of low-income clients. For this
reason, low-income persons and their LSC-funded lawyers should be al-
lowed to pursue class action cases that they conclude the law allows and
the needs of the clients require.
The policy justification for the class action prohibition-that it will fo-
cus LSC-funded attorneys on the individual problems of their clients rather
than the poor as a group--does not withstand scrutiny. The involvement
of LSC-funded attorneys in class actions at the time the prohibition was
enacted was only a tiny percentage of all of their court cases. More impor-
tant, class action representation affords LSC-funded lawyers the opportu-
nity to provide meaningful judicial relief to large numbers of low-income
individuals who share common legal problems. Class actions are merely a
procedural means to address the significant legal problems of many indi-
vidual low-income persons in a single case. Class actions serve to benefit
rather than to disadvantage the low-income individuals whom LSC-funded
lawyers are authorized to serve.
61. Pennington v. Doherty, 110 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds,
522 U.S. 909 (1997).
62. Class Actions, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,754 (Dec. 2, 1996).
63. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, LEFr OUT IN THE COLD: How CLIENTS ARE AFFECTED BY
RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR LEGAL SERVICES LAWYERS 8-10 (2000), http://www.brennancenter.org
/dynamic/subpages/atj6.pdf.
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B. Seeking Political/Social Change Using Federal Funds
The second identifiable policy reason supporting the ban on LSC-
funded attorneys from litigating class action cases is to prevent the attor-
neys from using federal dollars to pursue political or social change. This
rationale assumes that class action litigation has primarily political or so-
cial goals rather than legal ones. 64
Federally-funded attorneys for the poor have long been criticized for
seeking to achieve law reform through their work.65 However, the princi-
pal vehicle available to these attorneys to seek reform of the law-
litigation-can only seek to have judges apply or interpret existing legal
standards in a particular factual context. Litigation is not a means to create
new laws or to change society beyond the reach of the law (e.g., to reduce
poverty or income/wealth inequalities in America).
Pennington is an example of a case that seeks to reform the law in that
plaintiffs' attorneys persuaded federal judges that existing federal statutes
and regulations demanded a more timely base period for UI than Illinois
statutes allowed. The application of the Illinois base period to UI claims
was found to be illegal by the federal courts in Pennington. These judicial
decisions did not create new laws but rather were based on an interpreta-
tion of an existing federal statutory/regulatory scheme. The decision in
favor of the plaintiff class in Pennington was made by a district court judge
and was upheld on appeal by three circuit court judges, all of whom were
nominated to the federal bench by President Reagan.66 Seeking application
or interpretation of existing law is not a radical act. It could as accurately
be described as enforcement of the law as reform of it.
Some victories for the poor in class action cases can certainly have po-
litical or social consequences. For example, there certainly were interest
groups or persons who were not pleased with the decisions of the federal
judges in Pennington that would likely result in an increase in UI taxes on
64. In his efforts to defend LSC from its congressional critics in the mid-1990s, LSC President
Alexander D. Forger was frustrated by the lack of understanding among members of Congress about
class actions. "I had the impression that many in Congress literally believed that a class action meant
'the lower classes against the upper classes.' There really was a lack of awareness on the part of most
of what a class action was all about, except it was bad." Forger, supra note 54, at 335.
65. Agnew, supra note 20; Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services Program: Unaccountable, Po-
litical Anti-Poor, Beyond Reform, and Unnecessary, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 321, 328 (1998).
66. The district court judge who entered the injunction in Pennington, Paul E. Plunkett, was nomi-
nated by President Reagan in 1982. The Seventh Circuit judges who affirmed the injunction in Pen-
nington were Circuit Judges Jesse E. Eschbach, Michael S. Kanne, and Kenneth F. Ripple. Each was
nominated to the Seventh Circuit by President Reagan: Judge Eschbach in 1981; Judge Ripple in 1985;
and Judge Kanne in 1987.
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Illinois employers67 to fund the estimated $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 in
UI benefits that would be triggered by implementation of the decisions.
However, any tax increase on employers in Illinois that would result from
the Pennington decisions would result from an interpretation of the law by
federal judges after the attorneys for the plaintiff class and the defendant
state officials both had a fair and full opportunity to contest the interpreta-
tion. A judge's proper role in deciding a class action case like Pennington
is to reach the correct legal result, apart from the political or social conse-
quences of the decision.
The use of federal dollars to fund legal representation for the poor has
been the source of controversy, particularly when the federal dollars sup-
port litigation against local, national, and state governmental entities.68
However, many low-income persons receive a variety of government bene-
fits from units of government at all levels. Many of these government
benefits, such as UI benefits, are based on complex federal and state statu-
tory and regulatory schemes. It is natural that many of the legal problems
that the poor face involve their eligibility for or their receipt of benefits
under these myriad government assistance programs.
To prohibit low-income persons from pursuing legal grievances
against government entities with the assistance of LSC-funded lawyers
would be to ignore a wide range of the civil legal problems of the poor.
Wisely, neither Congress nor LSC have chosen to enact such a draconian
prohibition, and LSC attorneys are free to assist their clients with most
government-related legal problems.
Since Congress has seen fit to allow LSC lawyers to assist their indi-
vidual low-income clients with grievances against government entities, the
use of federal dollars to fund class actions against government agencies or
others is similarly legitimate. Class actions are simply a procedural
mechanism in litigation to aggregate common legal claims on behalf of a
large number of persons who share them. If the underlying legal claims of
the members of a class can lawfully be pursued by LSC attorneys on behalf
of the members as individuals, federal LSC dollars are not tainted by being
expended in a class action case in which the individuals' identical claims
are pursued together.
For many years, federal LSC funds were used to fund the plaintiffs' le-
gal representation in Pennington. At its core, Pennington represented an
effort to enforce federal legal standards on a state-administered govern-
ment assistance program. The federal judges in Pennington decided that
67. UI benefits in Illinois are paid from a fund based on contributions of employers in Illinois. 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/240 (2007).
68. RHODE, supra note 9, at 63.
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federal laws must be followed in the administration of Illinois's UI pro-
gram. Federal law was upheld in Pennington. It is difficult to imagine a
more appropriate use of federal dollars than to fund a successful class ac-
tion case like Pennington, which sought to enforce federal legal standards
on behalf of thousands of needy low-income persons. Pennington does not
represent political action by LSC-funded attorneys but rather a vindication
of principles of federalism and enforcement of the rule of law-on behalf
of a large group of low-income Americans.
V. POLICY REASONS TO ALLOW CLASS ACTIONS BY LSC-FUNDED
ATTORNEYS
Allowing LSC-funded attorneys to represent their clients in class ac-
tions offers many benefits. Among these benefits are as follows: economi-
cal expenditure of public funds, judicial efficiency, accountability and de-
terrence, hiring and retention of attorneys for the poor, and equal justice.
A. Economical Expenditure of Public Funds
The Legal Services Corporation Act requires that its grants be "made
so as to provide the most economical and effective delivery of legal ser-
vices. '69 Federal taxpayers also have a strong interest in public funds ex-
pended in an economical manner. The prohibition against class actions by
LSC-funded lawyers undermines the goal of the economic expenditure of
public funds.
One indisputable fact about civil legal assistance to the poor is that the
assistance of LSC-funded lawyers is a scarce resource. Unlike holdings in
criminal cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hold that indigent
litigants in civil cases are entitled to free legal representation at govern-
ment expense.70 Surveys of the civil legal needs of low-income Americans
consistently show that they are able to access legal assistance for no more
than one in five of their legal problems.7' Since 1980, funding for LSC has
declined by approximately half in real dollars.72 The reality is that LSC-
funded attorneys have only been able to provide legal assistance to their
low-income clients in a small fraction of the situations in which assistance
is needed.
69. Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 1007(a)(3).
70. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
71. LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 4 (2005); RHODE, supra
note 9, at 3, 103.
72. Houseman, supra note 8, at 22, Legal Services Corporation Appropriations table.
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A class action allows the aggregation, in a single lawsuit, of the claims
of all persons who share a common legal position. Consequently, class
actions offer the opportunity to provide meaningful judicial relief to a large
number of aggrieved individuals.
In Pennington, Luella Pennington was certified by the federal courts to
represent all Illinois UI claimants who had been or would be denied bene-
fits because their lag quarter wages were not considered part of their base
period.73 Due to this class certification and Ms. Pennington's meritorious
legal position in her case, her LSC-funded attorneys represented between
14,000 to 40,000 Illinois UI claimants who would annually be denied
benefits because of the exclusion of their lag quarter wages from their base
period. The class action in Pennington had the potential to avert a signifi-
cant legal problem for tens of thousands of needy Illinois residents each
year.
Representing, in one class action case, thousands of persons who
would be illegally denied government benefits by state officials is obvi-
ously an economical way of redressing their grievances. For LSC-funded
attorneys, the alternative to pursuing a class action case on behalf of the
Pennington class was to represent some of the thousands of persons in Illi-
nois who would annually be denied UI benefits because of the exclusions
of their lag quarter wages in separate cases challenging the denial of each
of their UI claims. This approach would result in a massive duplication of
efforts by the LSC-funded attorneys in a potentially huge number of cases
involving an identical legal issue. The expense of such an undertaking
would be enormous. Undoubtedly, many of the persons who would be
denied UI benefits by Illinois because their lag quarter wages were not
considered part of their base period would not seek legal assistance to chal-
lenge the denial of their claims. Such persons would not receive the legal
benefit that a successful conclusion to a class action affords, and the
unlawful denial of their UT claims would not be vindicated. Finally, if
LSC-funded attorneys must pursue duplicative individual case representa-
tion on behalf of their clients with similar legal positions, it will render
those attorneys unavailable to represent other low-income clients who have
different but legitimate legal claims or defenses.74
The prohibition of class actions by LSC-funded attorneys undermines
the goal of the economical expenditure of federal LSC funds. It results in a
denial of legal assistance and protection of the law to poor clients who
73. Pennington v. Doherty, 110 F.3d 502, 503 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, vacated on other
grounds, 522 U.S. 909 (1997).
74. Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Repre-
sentation, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 28 (1984).
Vol. 6, No. I
HeinOnline  -- 6 Pierce L. Rev. 68 2007-2008
CLASS ACTIONS AND THE POOR
could benefit if class action litigation were utilized in meritorious cases.
Appropriate class actions allow LSC-funded programs to maximize the
number of low-income clients they can assist with their limited resources,
and this result is entirely consistent with the congressional goal of "eco-
nomical and effective delivery of legal services" by LSC.
B. Judicial Efficiency
Class actions are allowed in civil litigation because they serve the im-
portant judicial functions of achieving economies of time, effort, and ex-
pense and promoting uniformity of adjudication for similarly situated per-
sons. 75 Class actions allow courts, in a single case, to efficiently adjudicate
the rights of numerous individuals who share a common legal position.
Even though LSC-funded attorneys can no longer pursue a class action
like Pennington on behalf of all Illinois residents who would be denied UI
benefits because their lag quarter wages are not considered part of their
base period, these attorneys could still represent the denied claimants in
individual cases. After all, each of these denied claimants would be a
needy person with a serious legal problem. This individual approach to an
identical problem would necessitate multiple cases being filed in the
courts, all raising the same legal issue. Does federal law require Illinois to
consider lag quarter wages to be part of the UI base period?
Multiple cases on behalf of individuals that raise the same legal issue
would result in hugely expensive duplication of filing, pleading, discovery,
and adjudication in the courts. The court personnel and judges involved in
these cases would expend their time very inefficiently. In addition, the
trial judges in each case could issue conflicting rulings, absent binding
appellate court precedent,76 resolving the legal issue common to each case.
One trial judge might conclude that federal law requires the inclusion of
lag quarter wages in the Illinois base period; another trial judge might con-
clude that it does not. The goal of the promotion of uniformity of adjudi-
cation would be poorly served by multiple individual decisions in cases
involving identical legal issues.
Class actions not only potentially benefit the members of a class, but
they serve judicial efficiency as well. All taxpayers have an interest in
judicial systems that hear claims and defenses efficiently and avoid the
inconsistent adjudication problems raised by multiple cases addressing the
same legal issue. Class actions promote judicial efficiency.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (see advisory committee's note).
76. Trial courts are only bound by stare decisis to follow the legal rulings of appellate courts in their
jurisdiction. RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 513 (2006).
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C. Accountability and Deterrence
A class action case necessarily focuses the court, the litigants, and their
attorneys on the institutional treatment of the class rather than on the par-
ticular plight of each member of the class. This institutional focus of the
litigation can offer increased public accountability for a proven wrong-
doer's conduct and greater deterrence of future wrongdoing by the litigants
and others.
If Ms. Pennington's claim had been pursued in court individually,
rather than as a class action, it would have represented the litigation of an
important legal problem for a former worker in Illinois. As a class action,
Ms. Pennington's claim represents the litigation of an important public
legal issue, the resolution of which could affect thousands of other needy
Illinois residents.
As an individual claim, Ms. Pennington's case would have faced sev-
eral outcomes. First, the state defendants might have offered Ms. Penning-
ton favorable settlement terms in order to moot out the claim and insulate
the Illinois base period from an adverse judicial decision.7 On the other
hand, once Ms. Pennington's case was certified as a class action, the case
could not be settled unless the court approved a settlement that was fair to
all class members.78
Second, if Ms. Pennington's claim had been litigated as an individual
case, there would have been no need to develop evidence about the 14,000
to 40,000 other Illinois residents who are annually denied millions of dol-
lars in UT benefits because of the exclusion of their lag quarter wages from
the base period.79 As a class action, the numerousness of the class is a cen-
tral issue in the class certification process, 80 and discovery would be al-
lowed to determine the number of persons affected by Illinois's base pe-
riod definition and the amount of their loss. Class action status allows the
trial judge to learn the full scope of the legal problem for all affected per-
sons and to provide appropriate remedies if the class action proves merito-
rious.
Third, if Ms. Pennington's individual case reached a final decision on
the merits by a trial judge finding that Illinois's base period violated fed-
eral law, that decision would apply to Ms. Pennington's UI claim only;
state officials would not be judicially required to follow the decision in
77. See Failinger & May, supra note 74, at 17; see also Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, IfYou Gag
the Lawyers, Do You Choke the Courts? Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions
Curb Advocacy by Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 873, 886-87 (2002).
78. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(1)(c).
79. See Abel & Udell, supra note 77, at 884-85.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
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considering future UI applications of other claimants. The state defendants
would also have no obligation to reconsider past UI denials for other per-
sons in Illinois whose lag quarter wages had not been considered part of
their base period.8' On the other hand, the interests of the class were inte-
gral to the judicial resolution of Pennington. The district court judge
weighed the benefits, to the thousands of members of the plaintiff class, of
including lag quarter wages in the base period against the costs to the state
to implement such an inclusion-and determined that the benefits to the
plaintiff class clearly outweighed the costs to the state.82 This cost-benefit
analysis led to the judge's holding that the federal law's commitment to the
prompt processing of UI claims was violated by Illinois's base period defi-
nition that excluded lag quarter wages. 8 3 Finally, the district court judge
authorized the issuance of a permanent injunction against the application of
the Illinois base period to the plaintiff class.84 The class action certification
in Pennington allowed Ms. Pennington, her attorneys, and the district court
to consider a judicial remedy that could benefit all of the persons in Illinois
who had been or would be adversely affected by Illinois's UI base period
definition. If Ms. Pennington had pursued the same case as an individual,
a favorable judicial ruling would have benefited only her.
Finally, if a trial judge found in Ms. Pennington's individual suit that
Illinois's base period violated federal law, such a decision would have lim-
ited preclusive effect on future, similar cases. It would not preclude the
state from opposing any similar claim made in a later case by another de-
nied UI claimant because the claim preclusion doctrine only bars claims
between the same parties involved in the initial case.85 It is possible that
the state would be precluded, in a later, similar case brought by a different
UI claimant, from relitigating the same legal issues adjudicated in Ms. Pen-
nington's individual case.86 However, this application of issue preclusion
would still necessitate piecemeal litigation involving identical legal issues
to be brought sequentially rather than in the more efficient class action
format. Moreover, a judgment in a class action has preclusive effect on the
members of the class for all claims litigated in the case.87 Thus, a class
action has the potential to definitively answer, in one case, legal questions
that affect large numbers of people.
81. See Abel & Udell, supra note 77, at 882-83.
82. See Pennington v. Doherty, No. 85 C 6327, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1058 (N.D. 111. July 11,
1986).
83. Id. at *12.
84. Id. at *12.
85. FREER, supra note 76, at 514.
86. Id. at 560-66.
87. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984).
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The poor are often affected uniformly by government policy or by the
conduct of private actors. Class actions allow the poor to challenge the
legality of these activities in a way that addresses the full dimensions of the
problems they create. Judges, in meritorious class actions, can fashion
judicial relief that fits the scope of these problems for all affected persons.
Class actions contribute to public accountability for illegal conduct and
offer comprehensive methods of providing judicial remedies to all of the
victims of the wrongful conduct.
D. Hiring and Retention of Attorneys
The prohibition of class action participation by LSC-funded attorneys
makes these positions less attractive to attorneys interested in serving the
legal needs of the poor. It eliminates from an LSC-funded attorney's prac-
tice experience, a complex and interesting means of representing their cli-
ents. More important, it renders unavailable to these attorneys an impor-
tant mechanism for effectively redressing the legitimate legal grievances of
their clients. It means that LSC-flmded attorneys must represent their cli-
ents with the proverbial "one hand tied behind the back," and many pro-
spective LSC-funded attorneys for the poor will find this limitation unat-
tractive.
Attorneys who are unable to represent their clients in class actions also
face ethical problems. Attorneys who are limited in their ability to pursue
a class action on behalf of their clients are compromised in their ethical
duty to provide effective representation and to exercise independent pro-
fessional judgment about that representation. 88 Moreover, there are certain
types of individual legal grievances that can only be effectively pursued in
a class action case (e.g., chronic delays in paying government benefits due
to government budget policies).8 9 An attorney who cannot pursue a class
action on behalf of a client when the attorney's professional judgment in-
dicates that a class action is the best approach to address the client's prob-
lem is left in an ethical morass. This ethical minefield for LSC-funded
attorneys, caused by restrictions on representation like the class action pro-
hibition, renders these attorney positions less appealing.
Available LSC-funded attorney jobs attract a limited pool of applicants
because of the low compensation these positions traditionally offer. When
the restrictions on representation and their attendant ethical challenges are
also considered, LSC-funded attorney positions become less attractive to
88. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974); RHODE, supra note 9,
at 114.
89. Failinger & May, supra note 74, at 17-18.
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prospective candidates. This is most unfortunate. Legal assistance to the
poor should attract a wide pool of excellent candidates for attorney posi-
tions. That is not the case when unsound restrictions, like the prohibition
on class action participation, render the positions professionally unattrac-
tive.
E. Equal Justice
The primary policy reason to allow class action participation by LSC-
funded attorneys is that the current prohibition undermines America's
commitment to equal justice under law. The stark reality is that LSC-
funded lawyers for the poor are the only lawyers in America who cannot
participate in class actions when the needs of their clients require it. Low-
income persons have as many or more civil legal problems as other Ameri-
cans, but they have fewer resources to respond. Yet, Congress has deter-
mined that it is necessary to limit the avenues of redress available to the
poor to deal with these legal problems. The prohibition on class actions
relegates the poor to second class justice, a fundamental wrong in a legal
system that seeks to guarantee all equal justice under law.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the prohibition of class action par-
ticipation by LSC-funded attorneys is based on unsound policy. As such,
the prohibition should be repealed. When it is repealed, America will
move a step closer to the Legal Services Corporation's goal "to provide
equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for individuals who seek
redress of grievances."
90
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1) (2006).
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